number of causal scenarios to a variety of outcomes This research examined how people simulate causal may serve to reduce likelihood estimates, whereas simscenarios. Several factors affect the perceived likeli-ulating several scenarios to the same outcome may inhood of a given causal scenario. In particular, generat-crease likelihood estimates (Gregory, Cialdini, & Caring one, several, or multiple causal scenarios affects penter, 1982; Hirt & Markman, 1995; Koehler, 1994 ; the perceived probability of the focal causal scenario. Levi & Pryor, 1987) .
It may be beneficial to define a few terms before we continue. We use the term scenario 1 to refer to the causal explanation that participants construct mentally to account for the data present in the decision problem. A causal scenario is the participant's educated guess about why an event took place. For example, we can hypothesize about the events that led up to the Oklahoma City bombing. We assume that participants form a causal scenario based on the media's detailed description of the events leading up to the actual bombing. A characteristic of scenarios is their plausibility. By definition, a plausible scenario is one that seems reasonable and is logically possible whereas an implausible causal scenario is one that seems unreasonable and is logically impossible (Oxford English Dictionary, 1982) . We distinguish between scenario plausibility and scenario likelihood because the reasonableness of a scenario does not necessarily imply its likelihood. For instance, a plausible cause of the crash of Flight 800 is that a terrorist planted a bomb in the cargo hold; that is, it is a reasonable cause of the crash. However, the actual probability that the crash was caused by a bomb is quite low; there was little evidence of explosive residue on the plane wreckage. It should be noted that our definition of plausibility differs from that used previously by Gettys and his colleagues. Previously, they used plausibility as roughly synonymous with likelihood. In this paper, plausibility refers to logical possibility, whereas likelihood refers to the actual strength or probability of a particular scenario.
Previous Research
There has been no research that has explicitly addressed how many causal scenarios people construct to given outcome. For example, some research suggests that having participants generate reasons their answer to a question might be wrong reduces their confidence to the outcome state (Fig. 1c) , or do they only construct a single path leading to the outcome state ( Fig. 1d) ? in their answer (Hoch, 1984; 1985; Koriat et al., 1980) . Koriat et al. (1980) argued that people naturally think Second, we studied how people judge the probability of a given causal scenario whereas previous research has of reasons they might be correct, but fail to think of reasons why they might be incorrect. In fact, Koriat et focused on how people judge the probability of a given outcome state (Carroll, 1978; Gregory et al., 1982; Hirt & al. (1980; see also Hoch, 1984; 1985) found that enticing participants to consider why they might be incorrect Markman, 1995; Koehler, 1991; Koriat et al., 1980) . Finally, the present research investigated whether the reduced confidence judgments. This suggests that people naturally consider only one possible outcome; they likelihood of the simulated causal scenarios affects the perceived likelihood of a given causal scenario. Previous typically fail to consider reasons they might be incorrect. research has found that the likelihood of different outcome states affects the probability of a particular outcome (Hirt & Markman, 1995) . Does the likelihood of 1 The terms causal scenario and path are used interchangeably the alternative causal scenarios affect the perceived throughout this paper. Although there are some differences between these three concepts, we do not distinguish among them.
likelihood of a particular causal scenario?
The second finding, suggesting that people may con-when left to their own devices. But, instructing participants to imagine the outcome state may encourage sider only one or a few causal scenarios, is that having them to construct multiple causal scenarios. The numparticipants imagine or explain a causal scenario inber of causal scenarios participants are able to construct creases the perceived probability of that causal scenario may then be used to evaluate the probability of the out- (Carroll, 1978; Gregory et al., 1982; Koehler, 1991) . For come. example, Carroll (1978) found that people believe more
In addition to the number of alternative causal scestrongly that a social event will take place if they are narios that people construct to a given outcome, there first asked to imagine the event. Similarly, Gregory et is at least one other factor that may contribute to the al. (1982) found that having participants imagine that perceived likelihood of a particular outcome. It is quite an event happened to them increased their subjective likely that the likelihood of the alternative causal scelikelihood estimate that the event would actually hapnarios affects the likelihood of the focal causal scepen to them. Evidently, the imagined event was made nario.
2 Take the crash of Flight 800 as an example. It more salient in memory and therefore seemed more is possible to think of several possible causal scenarios likely. Finally, Levi and Pryor (1987) found that likelileading up to the crash. It is possible that a bomb was hood estimates were correlated with the number of reaplanted by a terrorist, that one of the engines exploded, sons participants listed in support of a particular outthat the aircraft was shot down by a missile, or that a come. Subjective likelihood estimates were higher when faulty fuel sensor ignited vaporized fuel in the empty participants listed several reasons than when they tank. Each of these causal scenarios is plausible, that listed relatively few reasons. is, each is a possible cause of the crash. However, the There are two possible explanations for the above four scenarios are not equally likely. Originally, most results. The first explanation is suggested by Gregory newscasters and investigators seemed to believe that et al. (1982) who argued that the act of imagination the most likely scenario was a bomb planted by a terrorcould make a single causal scenario more salient in ist. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. memory and therefore make the outcome seem more First, the newscasters and investigators may have comlikely. The second possibility is that imagination causes pletely failed to generate alternative causal scenarios. people to think of several ways the proposed event could As suggested above, the failure to think of alternative take place. Thus, people may only construct one causal causal scenarios may lead people to be overconfident scenario naturally but then construct several additional in the focal scenario. Second, the investigators could scenarios when asked to imagine the event. The sudden have generated alternative causal scenarios but judged realization that there are several ways that the outcome them to be so unlikely that they were discounted or might obtain may lead participants to believe more eliminated from serious consideration. Thus, the initial strongly that the event will actually happen. Thus, hav-portion of the investigation of the crash focused on finding people imagine an event or outcome increases their ing support for the "bomb planted by a terrorist" scecertainty in that event or outcome by enticing them to nario because it was viewed as highly likely. The alterconstruct several causal scenarios.
native causal scenarios were either eliminated from The studies reviewed above indicate that people only serious consideration or were discounted because they simulate one or at most a few causal scenarios leading were seen as unlikely. Only after the "bomb planted by to a single outcome. Moreover, these studies suggest a terrorist" scenario failed to receive support were the that the perceived likelihood of a particular outcome is alternatives examined more closely. We hypothesize closely tied to the number of scenarios people construct. that simulating unlikely causal scenarios will have litFor example, participants in the Koriat et al. (1980) tle effect on the perceived probability of the focal causal study appeared to think only of reasons their answer scenario, whereas simulating likely causal scenarios was correct unless explicitly asked to generate reasons will have a relatively large impact on the perceived they might be incorrect. Participants who thought of probability of the focal causal scenario. We are not reasons they might be incorrect showed less overconfi-aware of any research that has directly addressed dence. Likewise, participants in Carroll (1978) , Gregory whether scenario likelihood affects the perceived likeliet al. (1982) , and Levi and Pryor (1987) appeared to hood of a particular causal scenario. have generated only one scenario unless they were inThe present research addresses two questions. In the structed to imagine the event actually occurring. In fact, each of these studies found that imagining the first experiment, we address the question of how many studies that examine the number of scenarios people construct when left to their own devices and the factors causal scenarios people construct when left to their own devices. Do participants construct one causal scenario that influence how many scenarios people construct. or several causal scenarios? Most of the previous re-
The Performance Continuum search in this area has attempted to induce participants to generate multiple scenarios by having them generate
The number of causal scenarios entertained by a decimultiple outcomes, or by having them think about mul-sion maker can logically range between one and an tiple outcomes. There has been no research to our arbitrarily large number. If a decision maker entertains knowledge that has been aimed specifically at examin-only one scenario leading to a particular outcome, this ing how many scenarios people construct to a given behavior can be characterized as single path. Singleoutcome when left to their own devices. In the second path behavior minimizes cognitive effort, but risks neexperiment, we address the question of whether the glecting the actual scenario that happened or will haplikelihood of the alternative scenarios affects the per-pen. Alternatively, the decision maker may entertain ceived probability of the focal causal scenario. Does many paths leading to an outcome; this behavior is simulating unlikely scenarios reduce the judged proba-termed multi-path. Multi-path behavior is much more bility of the focal scenario to the same extent as simulat-complete; it is the more normative behavior if "cost of ing likely scenarios?
thinking" issues (Shugan, 1980) are ignored. It should Our approach to addressing these questions differs include what actually happened or will happen. In thefrom previous research in two respects. First, previous ory, the number of possible scenarios may be infinite. research has focused on participants' likelihood esti-In practice, however, problem constraints and the pracmates of the outcome of a causal scenario. In the present tical equivalence of similar scenarios which differ only studies, our participants judged the likelihood of a par-in inconsequential details usually means that only a ticular causal scenario leading to a given outcome (the finite number of scenarios need be considered. This Focal Scenario). This approach enables us to determine continuum captures the behavior of any decision maker, what factors influence how people assign likelihood es-and is one dimension of their performance. Thus, we timates to causal chains and to determine how many can characterize behavior as being either single-path, scenarios people simulate to a given outcome. Second, several-path (involving several scenarios) or mult-path. previous research has not controlled for the number of outcome states participants generate. For example, it The Generation and Evaluation of Causal Scenarios is possible to simulate several scenarios leading to the We hypothesize causal scenarios are created by two same outcome or several scenarios leading to different sub-processes: (1) a scenario-generation process (Getoutcomes. Thus, it is not clear from previous research tys & Fisher, 1979) and (2) a scenario-evaluation proif likelihood estimates decreased because participants cess (Fisher, Gettys, Manning, Mehle, & Baca, 1983) . generated multiple scenarios or because they generated These are followed by a third process called the leading multiple outcomes, or both. In the present studies, we contender process. These processes are fairly complihold the outcome state constant and study how many cated, and should be discussed with some care. scenarios people simulate to the single outcome (this is similar to the typical hindsight problem where the The scenario-generation process. The initial generation of scenarios may involve consistency checking outcome is given, and the participants' task is to judge what the likelihood of the event would have been had (Fisher et al., 1983) . This process occurs if the data of a problem are first processed, or unfold, over time. the judgment been made in foresight). This has the advantage of allowing us to determine how many causal Scenarios are suggested by one or several data and become active in memory. When new data arrive, or are scenarios people simulate to a single outcome (one or many), and to determine if the likelihood of those sce-considered, the logical consistency of the scenarios are checked in light of the newly processed information narios affects the judged probability of the focal causal scenario. and the scenarios are either retained or abandoned for logical inconsistency with the data at this point. Thus, In the next section, we describe a performance continuum that necessarily captures the range of human per-the implausible causal scenarios are eliminated early on in the generation process. Consistency checking is formance when generating and evaluating causal scenarios. We describe the endpoints of this continuum as assumed to be a high-speed semantic verification process, not the lengthy pondering of the likelihood of a limiting-case strategies, and review a number of empirical findings that suggest that people's reasoning strate-scenario. If a scenario survives the consistency checking process it possesses the minimum requirements necesgies are rather simplistic and fall toward the lower end of this continuum. Finally, we present two empirical sary, that of logical consistency with the data, and it may become a leading contender candidate. It should leading contenders are less likely than previously believed. After one or more scenarios have been generated, be noted that the consistency checking process involves the activation of scenarios in memory, even if the sce-the leading contender criterion apparently becomes stricter and stricter, and the decision maker is less and narios are later discarded for inconsistency. In fact, Fisher et al. estimated that participants generated and less willing to admit new scenarios into the set that is being seriously considered. Thus, the number of scenarrejected about one or two hypotheses in the consistency checking process before generating a consistent hypoth-ios in the set of leading contenders is limited and typically consists of several. However, the composition of esis. We will return to this point when we discuss our results.
the set changes dynamically as new scenarios are added and old scenarios are discarded. The scenario-evaluation process. Once a scenario
Although the generation and evaluation processes has been generated and checked for logical consistency, are quite different, the failure to populate a hypothesis we assume that it is evaluated to decide if it is a leading set can result from either or both processes. For examcontender. We assume that this evaluation is accom-ple, people may fail to generate alternatives altogether plished by simulating the scenario in memory (Kahne-or they may initially consider multiple scenarios and man & Tversky, 1982) . Exactly how this evaluation pro-then reject several of them because they are judged ceeds is not clear in Kahneman and Tversky's implausible or inconsistent. At any rate, the net result description of the simulation process, nor has there of both processes combined is the serious consideration been much research on this topic. We assume that the of only one or a few alternatives. In the next section, we decision maker traverses the scenario. We would sup-review several empirical results supporting this idea. pose that the presence of chance forks in the scenario that are unlikely reduces its overall likelihood. It is not
Evidence for Simple Reasoning Strategies clear if scenario likelihood is determined by the average strength of the links in a scenario, by some sort of a
The first and most obvious instance of simple reasonproduct rule as suggested by probability theory, or by ing is that which occurs in hindsight. One explanation the strength of the weakest link, or the strongest link. of hindsight is that people fail to construct multiple
We do know that human likelihood estimates are but causal scenarios leading from the initial state to the weakly related to veridical likelihood estimates (Gettys, outcome state. Rather, people tend to focus on what did Mehle, & Fisher, 1986) ; human estimates of likelihood happen without regard for what could have happened have at best a rough correspondence with veridical val-but did not. This neglect of alternative causal scenarios ues. The likelihood of enumerated sets of hypotheses is naturally leads people to overestimate the predictabiloverestimated as compared to a diffuse, catch-all alter-ity of what did happen, the well-known hindsight bias native, apparently because the catch-all scenario must (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) . Thus, overbe populated with scenarios before it can be accurately confidence in hindsight may occur because people fail evaluated (Mehle, Gettys, Manning, Baca, & Fisher, to think of alternative states of the world. 1981; Tversky & Koehler, 1994) .
A second example of simple reasoning is the confirmation bias (Wason, 1960; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) . The leading contenders. Scenarios are not continually generated over time, but instead are generated The confirmation bias is the tendency to search for information that confirms a hypothesis rather than insporadically. Apparently there are two major occasions for generation: first, at the start of a problem, and sec-formation that disconfirms a hypothesis. We argue that this is best explained by the tendency to construct one or ond, if it is realized that the existing scenarios are not entirely consistent with the data. Gettys and Fisher a few causal scenarios and that people's mental models usually contain only information that pertains to one (1979) conducted one of the early studies in this area. Although their results are far from definitive, Gettys scenario, i.e., the alternative made explicit by the task.
For example, Wason (1960) presented participants and Fisher suggest that subjects work with several "good" scenarios at once; they termed these the "leading three numbers (e.g., 2, 4, 6) and told them that the numbers corresponded to a simple rule (e.g., three cards contenders." A new scenario is added to the "leading contenders" list only if it is sufficiently likely to become in ascending order). The participants' task was to discover the simple rule by making up sets of three numa leading contender itself. Alternatively, a new scenario may replace a less-likely scenario and hence the number bers. Two different classes of strategies can be used to arrive at the correct rule: (1) participants can use an of "leading-contender" scenarios will not necessarily increase. Thus, unlikely scenarios will not be added to the enumerative strategy in which they try to learn the rule by generating confirming alternatives, or (2) partiset of leading contenders. Most scenarios are generated when disconfirming events suggest that the current cipants can use an eliminative strategy in which they try to learn the rule by generating disconfirming alter-did not result in complete hypothesis sets. We believe that the natural tendency is to construct only one, or natives. Wason (1960) found that participants tended to use enumerative strategies rather than eliminative at best a few, hypotheses and that under normal circumstances people do not typically "try harder." Instead, it strategies. Thus, participants generated instances that supported their working hypothesis and failed to gener-is more likely that people come up with what they think are the best one or two possibilities. Overconfidence ate instances that refuted their working hypothesis. This work and other work using the 2-4-6 task reveals arises because people fail to recognize that there are many other viable alternatives (Fischhoff, Slovic, & that participants generally fail to generate alternative hypotheses unless the task is structured to get them to Lichtenstein, 1978; Mehle, Gettys, Manning, Baca, & Fisher, 1981; Koehler, 1994) . In summary, people are do so (Tweney, Doherty, Worner, Pliske, Mynatt, Gross, & Arkklin, 1980) . The tendency for people to overconfident in the completeness of their hypothesis search for confirming evidence is indicative of the type sets because they fail to recognize how many possible of simplistic reasoning that we propose people engage alternative competing hypotheses exist. in more generally. Instead of generating and testing
The present research examines two factors that may multiple hypotheses, people entertain only a limited affect the perceived likelihood of the focal causal scenumber of hypotheses when trying to induce even the nario: (1) the number of alternative causal scenarios simplest of rules such as "three numbers in ascending people construct, and (2) the likelihood of the alternaorder." Only when the task is familiar and concrete tive causal scenarios. In experiment 1 we test the hy-(e.g., Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972) or pothesis that the perceived likelihood of the focal causal when alternative causal models are made explicit (e.g., scenario decreases as the number of alternative causal Doherty, Chadwick, Garavan, Barr, & Mynatt, 1996 ; scenarios simulated increases. In the second experi- Jou, Shanteau, & Harris, 1996) do people consistently ment, we test the hypothesis that the perceived likelisearch for disconfirming evidence.
hood of the focal causal scenario is affected by the likeli-A phenomenon closely related to the confirmation hood of the alternative causal scenarios. bias, called the pseudodiagnosticity effect, has been studied extensively by Doherty and his colleagues (DohGeneral Approach erty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979) . The pseudodiagnosticity effect occurs when people consider P(DԽH),
In the present research we examined how many scebut neglect P(DԽϳH), when both are necessary for nornarios people simulate to a given outcome state. We mative diagnostic inference. This may be the result of hypothesized that participants would simulate relaa positive testing strategy that prevents people from tively few causal scenarios overall and that the likeliconsidering information relevant to alternative hypothhood of the focal causal scenario (i.e., the to-be-judged eses altogether. This notion is consistent with Doherty scenario) would decrease as the number of alternative et al. 's (1996) finding that participants only consider scenarios simulated increased.
P(DԽH) unless the task is designed to make both P(DԽH)
We used a thought-listing procedure (Cacioppo & and P(DԽϳH) salient. Petty, 1981) to determine the number and type of causal The final example of simplified reasoning is exempliscenarios generated by the scenario generation process. fied by work on hypothesis and act generation. In a
The thought-listing technique should capture those series of studies, Gettys and his colleagues (Gettys & causal scenarios people generate while making the like- Fisher, 1979; Gettys, Pliske, Manning, & Casey, 1987) lihood judgment. The thought-listing procedure was found that participants' hypotheses or act sets were used as a basis for classifying responses as single-path largely impoverished, even after much encouragement or several-path. Extensive pilot testing found that the to generate all hypotheses or acts. Moreover, particithought-listing procedure was a more accurate measure pants in these studies typically are overly confident of mental simulation than an indirect technique. In the that their hypothesis sets are complete. For example, pilot study, we compared a reaction-time procedure that in one study participants thought they had generated required participants to verify the truth of possible about 75% of the total acts in the set when in fact they causes (a sentence verification technique) and found it had generated only 20-30% of the total positive utility to be inferior to the simpler thought-listing technique; acts (Gettys et al., 1987) . We propose that the incomi.e., the sentence verification technique did not account pleteness of the hypothesis sets is largely attributable for as much variance in the likelihood data as was acto simplified reasoning strategies such as single-path counted for by the thought-listing technique. The exact reasoning or several-path reasoning. Although particimethod for scoring the thought listings is presented in pants in these studies did generate several hypotheses, several requests by the experimenter to think harder the first part of the results section.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants were first presented a short vignette on the computer screen. After reading the vignette, the Method participants pressed a key to continue and were then asked to estimate the likelihood of the focal causal sceParticipants nario. For example, in the Bill story above, participants Forty-two participants were paid $10 an hour to par-were asked "What is the likelihood that Bill died of ticipate in this experiment. Most of the participants smoke inhalation?" Likelihood estimates were made by were enrolled in undergraduate courses but a few were adjusting a tick mark on a line on the computer screen. employed by the university.
The line was anchored at zero with "highly unlikely," at .5 with "50:50 chance," and at 1.0 with "highly likely." Materials After the likelihood estimation task, participants were given the thought-listing task in which they were told to Vignettes. The stimuli were six vignettes describing try and remember all the ideas they had while thinking various events and varied in length from 75 to 130 about the likelihood question. Participants typed their words. The paragraphs consisted of a character and a thoughts into the computer. short description of an event. The vignettes were conAfter performing the thought-listing task, the experistructed so that one particular causal scenario was ment proceeded with the next vignette. This continued made salient, with other possible causal scenarios omituntil the participant completed all six vignettes. The ted. This was done by highlighting evidence suggesting presentation order of the vignettes was randomized for one cause and by leaving out information suggesting each participant. other possible causes. The following story is an example of the stimuli used.
Results and Discussion
It was the smokiest fire that Bill had seen in his eight years as focal causal scenario made salient in the vignette (e.g., Bill died from smoke inhalation). Causes other than The essential characteristic of this paragraph is that the focal causal scenario were classified as Alternative the most salient cause of death is smoke-inhalation. Causes (e.g., the building may have collapsed and killed However, there is no explicit mention of the cause of Bill). Focal-Counterfactual Thoughts consisted of readeath; Bill could have died from severe burns, from sons the focal cause may be wrong (e.g., firefighters falling debris, from heat exhaustion, or from falling wear oxygen masks, so Bill couldn't have died from down the stairs. The results of two pilot studies indi-smoke inhalation). Alternative-Counterfactual cated that the focal causal scenario (e.g., smoke inhala-Thoughts consisted of reasons an alternative causal tion) was salient enough that almost everyone thought scenario might be wrong (e.g., Bill's protective clothing of it.
Scoring of the Thought-Listing Data
would have prevented severe burns). Not-classifiable were those thoughts which did not fit into any of the Procedure and Design previous categories and were therefore uninterpretable (e.g., Bill was a dummy and shouldn't have gone in). A Participants were run individually on computers. The instructions were presented both verbally and on the kappa statistic of .75 (p Ͻ .01) was obtained for interjudge reliability, showing that the judges had good computer. Participants were told that they would be presented with several vignettes about which they agreement.
For analysis purposes, we combined the Focal Causes would be making likelihood judgments. They were instructed to read the vignettes carefully as they would and the Alternative-Counterfactual Thoughts for each participants' response to each scenario because both be asked several questions about the story following the likelihood task. Following the presentation of the of these response types suggest that participants only seriously considered the focal causal scenario. Likeinstructions, the participants were given a short practice session to familiarize themselves with the tasks wise, the Alternative Causes and the Focal-Counterfactual Thoughts were combined because both of these they would be performing. response types suggest that people are thinking of several causal scenarios. We then combined the thoughtlisting responses into a ratio index (I) using the equation
where FC is the total number of Focal Causes, ACT is the total number of Alternative-Counterfactual Thoughts, AC is the total number of Alternative Causes listed, and FCT is the number of Focal-Counterfactual Thoughts. This index has been used previously by Levi and Pryor (1987) and it reflects the relative number of thoughts that were given in support of the Focal Cause versus Alternative Causes. A value greater than or equal to 1.0 suggests that the participant generated participant generated support for alternative causal scenarios. Each of the six responses for each participant (one for each scenario) was classified by the following The R 2 statistics are the appropriate statistics to look criteria: responses where I Ն 1.0 were classified as sin-at here because the classification of responses was pergle-path (indicating that relatively more ideas were formed post hoc. This means that observations are not listed in favor of the focal causal scenario); responses randomly assigned to groups and for some vignettes where I Յ 1.0 were classified as several-path (indicating the classification resulted in an unequal number of parthat relatively more support was listed in favor of alter-ticipants classified into the two groups. native causal scenarios). This classification resulted in It is also possible to examine each participant individan unequal number of responses being classified as ually to see if the overall pattern of results was true at single-path and several-path for some of the scenarios. the individual level. For example, of a participant's six Each problem was analyzed separately using AN-responses three might have been classified as single-OVA. The analyses were done separately because most path and three classified as several-path. (In fact, 37 of the participants had some responses that were classi-of the 42 participants had some responses classified as fied as single-path and some responses that were classi-single-path and some classified as several-path.) It is fied as several-path. Only 4 out of the 42 participants therefore possible to examine whether each particiused single-path reasoning exclusively and only 1 par-pant's likelihood estimates were higher when they used ticipant used several-path reasoning exclusively.
single-path reasoning versus when they used several- Figure 2 plots the mean likelihood estimates of the path reasoning. This analysis was consistent with the focal causal scenario for all six vignettes for responses overall analysis as 33 of the 37 participants (89%) who classified as single-path and responses classified as sev-had both single-path and several-path responses gave eral-path. As can be seen, likelihood estimates for responses classified as single-path were substantially mates than people who used several-path reasoning.
higher likelihood estimates for responses classified as as a natural part of the simulation process. 3 The question of whether scenario likelihood affects the perceived single-path than for those classified as several-path.
The results from the above analyses confirmed our likelihood of the focal causal scenario was the focus of Experiment 2. expectation that likelihood estimates are lower when participants generate several causal scenarios. This A second explanation for why participants generated several scenarios in some cases and one in other cases is finding is consistent with Hirt and Markman (1995) who found that generating multiple scenarios debiased that some participants had more knowledge concerning some of the vignettes than other vignettes, and were likelihood judgments. Although our results reduce to correlational data, we have in essence extended the therefore able to more easily generate alternative causal scenarios for some vignettes but not for others. findings of Levi and Pryor (1987) who found that the number of reasons given in support of a particular out-For example, a participant who knows a lot about fires might be able to generate more causal scenarios than come was correlated with the perceived likelihood of that outcome. Our results have shown that the likeli-a participant who knows relatively little about fires.
Likewise, it is possible for a single participant to have hood of a particular causal scenario is related to the number of causal scenarios constructed. In short, the more knowledge about fires than about the topics used in the other vignettes. Whereas we cannot rule this results of Experiment 1 indicate that simulating several causal scenarios results in distributing likelihoods explanation out, we find it unlikely as the vignettes were concerned with everyday general knowledge topics among those scenarios, such that the likelihood of the focal causal scenario was decreased.
and were relatively simple. Experiment 1 has provided insight into how people construct and simulate causal scenarios. An interesting
EXPERIMENT 2
aspect of the present data is that we found very few people who used exclusively single-path reasoning (only Experiment 2 extended the findings of Experiment 1 4 out of 42 participants) and even fewer who used exclu-by looking more closely at the effects of scenario likelisively several-path reasoning (only 1 out of 42 partici-hood on the judged likelihood of the focal causal scepants). This is interesting because it suggests that par-nario. In addition, the design used in Experiment 2 ticipants are capable of generating several causal allowed for a direct test of the scenario-evaluation proscenarios and in many cases actively generate several cess (Gettys & Fisher, 1979) as a possible determinant causal scenarios without explicit instructions to do so. of single-path reasoning. In short, we propose that sinIn fact, 37 of the 42 participants generated several gle-path reasoning may arise because the scenario-evalcausal scenarios for at least one vignette.
uation process reduces the number of scenarios being Why did participants generate one causal scenario considered to a few; scenarios that are not likely enough for some vignettes and several causal scenarios in other to be a leading contender will be eliminated from serivignettes? One possible factor that may influence how ous consideration (cf. Gettys & Fisher, 1979) . The scemany causal scenarios a participant constructs is the narios remaining in the set of leading contenders may likelihood of those scenarios. For example, if several then be evaluated individually by a more thorough procausal scenarios are likely, then one would expect parti-cess. Thus, single-path reasoning may occur when only cipants to construct several scenarios. However, if the one scenario is generated or when only one scenario is alternative scenarios are all unlikely, then we would admitted into the set of leading contenders. Severalexpect participants to construct only a single causal path reasoning may occur when several scenarios are scenario. In fact, the counterfactual argumentation re-generated and admitted into the set of leading contendvealed in the thought-listing data suggests that the ers. Thus, the net result of the scenario-evaluation proparticipants were judging the likelihood of the causal cess is that fewer scenarios are seriously considered. scenarios that they constructed (cf. Gettys & Fisher, The same basic experimental design used in Experi-1979) . For example, the statement "firefighters wear ment 1 was used here except that we created three oxygen masks, it must have been something else" indi-versions for each vignette: (1) Alternatives Made Likely, cates that the participant thought that dying of smoke (2) Alternatives Made Unlikely, and (3) the original viinhalation was unlikely. Previous research has explic-gnettes from Experiment 1, the Generic Versions. These itly asked participants to generate counterfactuals or three versions differed with respect to the number of "con" reasons (e.g., Hirt & Markman, 1995; Hoch, 1985; Koriat et al., 1980) and have found that doing so gener-likely scenarios that could be generated. In the Alterna-regarding alternative causal scenarios was omitted (Generic Version condition). In the Alternatives Made tives Made Likely versions, information was added to increase the likelihood of the alternative causal scenar-Likely condition, information was added to the vignettes to make the alternative causal scenarios more ios. In the Alternatives Made Unlikely versions, information was added so that the alternative causal scenar-likely. The information added to the Bill vignette to make the alternatives more likely is given below: ios were made unlikely. The Generic Versions were the same vignettes used in Experiment 1.
It was a relatively hot fire.
This design allowed us to test how the likelihood of
The building was made primarily of wood beams, as it was a the alternative causal scenarios affects the perceived relatively old building.
likelihood of the focal causal scenario by manipulating
In this version, the likelihood of something falling on the likelihood of the alternative scenarios in the viBill is increased because it is an old building and is gnettes. We predicted that the judged likelihood of the supported by wood beams. In addition, it is a hot fire focal causal scenario should decrease as the likelihood so the likelihood of Bill dying of heat exhaustion or of the alternative causal scenarios increases. Thus, we severe burns is also increased. In the Alternatives Made hypothesize that the likelihood of the focal causal sceUnlikely versions, information was added to the vinario will be highest in the Alternatives Made Unlikely gnettes to make the alternative causal scenarios less condition and lowest in the Alternatives Made Likely likely. Below is the information added to the Bill vicondition. This would indicate whether participants gnette to make the alternatives unlikely: consider the likelihood of the alternative causal scenarios when judging the likelihood of the focal scenario.
It was a relatively cool fire.
The building was made primarily of steel beams and concrete,
The use of a leading contender mechanism to prune as it was a relatively new building.
the number of causal scenarios under consideration would be supported if the number of Alternative Causal In this version, information is added such that the Scenarios listed in participants' thought-listings de-likelihood of death from a falling beam, heat exhauscreased as the likelihood of those alternatives decreased tion, or from severe burns is decreased. For both condibecause the unlikely scenarios should be eliminated tions, we tried to incorporate the added information from contention. Two separate results should be re-in the first half of the vignettes. However, we did not vealed if participants are eliminating the unlikely sce-sacrifice the clarity or coherence of the vignettes. Hence, narios. First, participants should list fewer alternative the information was added to the scenarios where it causal scenarios as the likelihood of the alternatives seemed most appropriate. decreases. Second, and more importantly, the eliminated causal scenarios should show up as counterfactu-Procedure and Design als in the thought-listing data; that is, participants should list more counterfactual causal scenarios as the The basic experimental design was a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with three different scenario likelihood of the alternatives decreases. We believe that counterfactual reasoning is the result of the evaluation types (Alternatives Made Likely, Alternatives Made Unlikely, Generic Version). Participants were tested inprocess and that the counterfactuals were scenarios that were rejected from the set of leading contenders. dividually on computers. Participants were presented six different vignettes, two from each level of likelihood.
Method
The vignettes were randomly assigned to participants to the constraint that each occurred the same number Participants of times in the experiment and that no vignette was Participants were 30 undergraduate students en-presented more than once to each participant. For exrolled in lower-level psychology courses. They received ample, the Alternatives Made Unlikely version of the partial credit for fulfillment of course requirements.
Bill vignette occurred the same number of times as the Alternatives Made Likely version of the Jane vignette.
Materials
Each participant was presented with two vignettes from the Alternatives Made Likely, two vignettes from The stimuli used in Experiment 1 served as the base stimuli for constructing two additional versions of each the Alternatives Made Unlikely, and two from the Generic Version conditions. Again, participants never saw vignette. The primary characteristic that varied across the different versions was if the alternative causal sce-the same vignette twice. For example, if a participant was presented with the Alternatives Made Unlikely Bill narios were made likely (Alternative Made Likely condition), if the alternatives were made unlikely (Alterna-vignette, then he or she would not be presented with either the Generic Version or Alternatives Made Likely tives Made Unlikely condition) or if information version of the Bill vignette. The order of presentation of the vignettes was randomized for each participant. The experimental procedures were the same as those used in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion

Scoring of the Generation Data and the ThoughtListing Data
The same procedure used in Experiment 1 was used again to classify the thought-listings. We obtained a kappa value of .84 (p Ͻ .01) showing good agreement between judges.
The primary data consist of the likelihood estimates and the thought-listing data. Because multiple observations are being taken from each participant, all of the data analyses reported will be repeated-measures AN-OVA's unless noted otherwise. We performed separate analyses for the likelihood judgments for each category of the thought-listing data. For example, the number Table  tives Made Unlikely condition and lowest in the Alter-2 and one for the likelihood data. The data analyses natives Made Likely condition. Thus, participants for the likelihood judgments are presented first. The judged the focal cause as relatively more likely when we thought-listing data are presented later.
made the alternative scenarios unlikely. This suggests that participants considered the likelihood of the alterLikelihoods natives when judging the likelihood of the focal causal Figure 3 shows the mean likelihood estimates for scenario. One way to test whether participants were the focal causal scenarios across the three levels of the judging the likelihood of the alternative causal scenarlikelihood of the alternative scenarios. There was a sig-ios is to examine the thought-listing data. nificant main effect of the likelihood of the alternative ( 2 ) is similar to the adjusted R 2 in that it is an estimate of the amount of variance in the dependent variable ex-*Significant p ϭ .01. **Significant p ϭ .07.
Thought-Listing
plained by the independent variable (Kirk, 1982).
and reject them from the set of leading contenders. We scenarios. Causal scenarios that were judged unlikely were eliminated from serious consideration. These resuggested that this would lend support for the scenarioevaluation mechanism. As can be seen in Table 2 , the sults also lend support for the two sub-processes discussed above. The generation process results in the mean number of Alternative-Counterfactual Thoughts increased across levels of scenario likelihood; this pat-generation of several possibilities irrespective of their probability. The evaluation process then eliminates all tern of results was marginally significant, F(5, 25) ϭ 2.30, p ϭ .07, 2 ϭ .06. An alternative explanation but the few best causal scenarios. People used severalpath reasoning when several scenarios were judged of this result is that the Alternatives Made Unlikely scenarios prompted participants to scrutinize all of the likely enough to be a leading contender. People used single-path reasoning when only one scenario was causal scenarios they constructed instead of just the alternative causes. If this were true, we would also judged likely enough to be a leading contender. Even if participants were to generate all possible causal sceexpect participants to list more Focal-Counterfactual Thoughts in the Alternatives Made Unlikely condition. narios, the evaluation process would prune that number to the best one or two causal scenarios. Given this, However, this is obviously not the case, (F(5, 25) ϭ 1.38, p ϭ .26). The scenario likelihood manipulation affected it is unlikely that people would ever use a multi-path reasoning strategy. the number of Alternative-Counterfactual Thoughts but not the number of Focal-Counterfactual Thoughts.
The third finding was that participants were neither strictly single-path nor several-path; i.e., they someTaken together, the thought-listing data reveal that participants initially consider alternative causal sce-times used a single-path strategy and other times used a several-path strategy. For example, less than 10% (4 narios, but then reject them when judged unlikely. This is reflected in the fact that participants initially gener-participants) of the participants in Experiment 1 used single-path reasoning for all six vignettes, and only 2% ate Alternative Causes but then negate those causes with counterfactuals causes.
(1 participant) used exclusively several-path reasoning.
In Experiment 2, we found that the number of causal The results presented above lend support for the idea that participants evaluate the likelihood of the scenar-scenarios people thought of was affected by the likelihood of the alternative causal scenarios. For example, ios produced by the generation process and then eliminate them from the set of leading contenders if they on average, participants listed less than .5 Alternative Causes in the Alternatives Made Unlikely condition, are not probable enough. This was supported both by the fact that participants listed fewer causal scenarios .65 Alternative Causes in the Generic condition, and .95 Alternative Causes in the Alternatives Made Likely as the likelihood of the alternatives decreased and by the fact that they listed more counterfactuals as the condition. Taken together, both experiments suggest that people are capable of simulating more than one likelihood of the alternatives decreased. Thus, it appears that participants systematically eliminated the causal scenario but that the number of scenarios people actually simulate may depend on the likelihood of the unlikely causal scenarios from the set of leading contenders.
various alternative causal scenarios.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Relation to Other Research
Our results are consistent with a number of previous The results of the experiments reported here demonstrate several important findings. First, we hypothe-findings. First, Fisher et al. (1983) estimated that participants generated and rejected one to two hypotheses sized that single-path reasoning would result in higher likelihood estimates for the focal causal scenario. The in a hypothesis generation task. Our results are remarkably similar to these findings. In our first experiresults of both experiments support this notion. In Experiment 1, we found that the tendency to use a single-ment, participants constructed only a few causal scenarios at most for each of the vignettes. Likewise, path reasoning strategy generally resulted in higher likelihood estimates for the focal causal scenario. In participants in our second experiment only constructed between 1.5 and 2 causal scenarios across the three Experiment 2, we found that the perceived likelihood of the focal causal scenario increased as the likelihood levels of scenario likelihood. The second line of research consistent with our findings is concerned with the of the alternative causal scenarios decreased.
Our second finding was that participants appeared pseudodiagnosticity effect (Doherty et al., 1979) . Doherty and his colleagues have found that participants to generate several causal scenarios initially, but then reject the scenarios that seemed unlikely. Instead of do not readily generate multiple hypotheses. Instead, participants tend to consider data as relevant to only working with a complete set of causal scenarios, participants seriously considered only the leading contender one hypothesis at a time and generally fail to use P(DԽϳH), unless it is made salient by the task environ-causal scenario led them to specify more details in the focal scenario but fewer details in the alternative scement (see Doherty et al., 1996 , for a more thorough treatment of this topic). Finally, our results are consis-narios. Thus, the focal causal scenario was judged as relatively more likely because it was highly detailed, tent with research on the confirmation bias (Wason, 1960) and positive test strategies (Klayman & Ha, whereas the alternative causal scenarios were judged as less likely because they were relatively less detailed. 1987). As pointed out earlier, participants in the 2-4-6 paradigm typically do not consider more than one hy-Unfortunately, this research was not designed specifically to test the predictions of MINERVA-DM and it is pothesis at a time when searching for the rule (Tweney et al., 1980) . Instead, participants try to generate posi-impossible to determine post hoc whether participants had more detail for the focal causal scenarios than for tive evidence for a single hypothesized rule rather than generating negative evidence in support of alternative the alternative causal scenarios. Additional research is needed to more thoroughly test this theoretical account. rules (Klayman & Ha, 1987) .
We propose that the scenario-generation and sceThe present experiments have illuminated some of the factors affecting how people construct and simulate nario-evaluation processes serve to reduce the load on working memory by eliminating implausible and un-causal scenarios. We have also identified factors that influence scenario likelihood or scenario strength. In likely causal scenarios. This supports Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragon's (1993) recent proposal that participants short, we have shown that the perceived likelihood of a particular causal scenario depends both on how many can hold and work with only one hypothesis in working memory at a time. Although some of our participants alternative causal scenarios the decision maker does construct and the likelihood of those alternative causal did generate several causal scenarios, this may have been due to the fact that our task was relatively simple. scenarios. We found that the perceived likelihood of the focal causal scenarios was higher when participants We imagine that the number of leading contenders held in working memory would decrease as the task diffi-only constructed a single path, than when they constructed several paths, and that participants conculty increased.
Finally, our results are consistent with MINERVA-structed fewer alternative causal scenarios and had more alternative counterfactual thoughts when the al-DM's explanation of the simulation heuristic (Dougherty, Gettys, & Odgen, submitted for publication). ternatives were unlikely. However, we believe that we have only scratched the surface of what is a very imIn MINERVA-DM, participants are assumed to probe memory with the various alternative causal scenarios. portant decision-making process. Future research should try to identify other factors that influence how The likelihood of the focal causal scenario is determined by how many scenarios are used to probe memory and people construct and simulate causal scenarios. the similarity between each of the various scenarios and likelihood of an event increased if participants were knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimenasked to imagine the event. Other research has found tal Psychology: Human, Perception, and Performance, 1, 288-299. that enticing participants to imagine alternative causal Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein (1978) . Fault trees: Sensitivity scenarios decreased the perceived likelihood of the focal of estimated failure probabilities to problem representation. Jourcausal scenario (Koriat et al., 1980 the current experiments, it is possible that merely asking our participants to judge the likelihood of the focal Fisher, S., Gettys, C., Manning, C., Mehle, T., & Baca, S. (1983).
